The UN Iranian Arms Embargo
The United States' failure at the UN to extend the Iranian arms embargo will lead to greater divergence between Washington and its allies on the question of relations with Tehran.
The United States has failed in lobbying the UN Security Council to extend the Iranian arms embargo, which is set to expire in October of this year. Aside from the Dominican Republic, Washington was unable to sway any other council member to vote for its proposal.
As a counter, the United States subsequently invoked the “snapback” mechanism that was a part of the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). The snapback was designed to reimpose all international sanctions against Iran, if it reneged on any of its commitments. This was the fundamental logic of the deal: Iran received sanctions relief in exchange for nuclear transparency and inspections by the the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
However the United States unilaterally withdrew from the deal after Trump assumed office and revived all of its sanctions against Tehran. As a result, the US is now isolated in its insistence that it still has the ability to invoke the snapback.
The White House argues this right “accrues” to it by virtue of it still being named in UN Resolution 2231. This resolution implemented the Iran deal by removing UN sanctions, which all member states had to enforce. Pompeo laid out the US position on August 20 at a briefing:
This – look, just, it’s important to emphasize this. 2231 gave every one of the participant states the right to execute snapback unconditionally. There are other nations that are not in compliance with the JCPOA today as well. They would have the right to conduct snapback as well. It’s written; it’s plain. It’s very straightforward. I know the Russians and the Chinese will try and obfuscate; they’ll use their disinformation tactics.
But just read the plain text of the document. It’s not the case that a political agreement arranged by a group of parties, including the United States, can undo the amazing work of the UN Security Council. No resolution can be altered unilaterally by any country – not by Iran, not by Russia, not China, nor by the United States. Security Council resolutions can only be changed by subsequent Security Council resolutions.
And so we think this is really straightforward. We think this is very simple. These UN Security Council resolutions will come back into place 31 days from now and the United States will vigorously enforce them.
Iranian Proxy Forces
From Washington’s perspective maintaining the embargo is imperative to containing Iranian influence in the Middle East and beyond. The United States claims that the embargo’s termination would result in an enhanced flow of materiel to Iranian proxy groups, while also allowing Iran to further develop its domestic capabilities. Regional states hostile to Iran also favour an extension of the embargo:
The GCC — comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — alleged Iran had “not ceased or desisted from armed interventions in neighboring countries, directly and through organizations and movements armed and trained by Iran.”
Of all of Iran’s proxy forces Hizballah is considered the most deadly by Congress. Its footprint is believed to be vast, and includes bases, or support infrastructure in Venezuela, the Tri-Border area, and, most extensively, in Lebanon. Congress continues to scrutinize Hizballah’s activities across the world, and have even proposed having the group assessed through the so-called “National Intelligence Estimate”.
Prospects
The United States will likely dramatically expand the use of its “secondary sanctions” against persons it deems to have aided or traded with Iran. This is a powerful tool, and has been largely responsible for Iran’s collapse in oil exports. International shippers, logistics providers, and even smugglers are wary of being targeted by the Department of Treasury.
Longer term, the United States is considering linking the return of the UK’s sanctions against Iran in exchange for a free-trade agreement. The British government has been pushing for such an agreement after Brexit, and views it as crucial for its program of “regaining sovereignty”.
Acts Reviewed
NIE on Iranian Proxy Forces Act
Congress finds the following:
(1)Hizballah is Iran’s oldest and most successful proxy force.
(2)Hizballah has trained militia groups in Iraq.
(3)Hizballah is active in Syria and its fighters have helped President Bashar Al-Assad maintain regime control.
(4)Hizballah fighters are returning to Lebanon more battle-tested and more capable than ever before.
(5)In 2006, Hizballah’s rocket and missile arsenal in Lebanon was approximately 15,000; however, by 2020, this figure has grown ten-fold to more than 150,000.
(6)With the assistance of Iran, Hizballah’s weapons arsenal has not only increased in quantity, but also quality, including technologically advanced weapons and more accurate missiles.
(7)Iran is reportedly building missile production facilities in Lebanon to enable an indigenous rocket-producing capability for Hizballah.
(8)Iran is actively pursuing its regional interests and challenging United States interests and United States allies through the use of proxy forces in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.
Comment: The US Congress remains actively focused on Hizballah and its global activities. This act would request a “National Intelligence Estimate” of Hizballah’s strength.
Sources and Methods
U.N. Ban on Iran Arms Transfers and Sanctions Snapback
If a sanctions snapback is not widely recognized or implemented, the Administration might use its sanctions authorities to deter any arms sales to Iran. These include the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA), Executive Order 13382, the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act, and Iran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism provides authorities for the President to sanction arms suppliers to Iran. Alternatively, the United States might try to work with potential arms sellers to Iran to dissuade them from completing any sales.
Comment: While these acts would allow the United States to sanctions involved in weapons transfers, many of the largest Chinese and Russians arms companies are already blacklisted.
The US Argument on Sanctions
The State Department is prepared to argue that the United States remains a “participant state” in the nuclear accord that Mr. Trump renounced — but only for the purposes of invoking the snapback.
In defending its pursuit of the embargo, Trump administration officials have argued that Iran has been violating the arms restrictions laid out in the 2015 nuclear agreement.
State Department 2018: Briefing on Iranian Arms Transfers
Iran has the largest ballistic missile force in the region, with more than 10 ballistic missile systems either in its inventory or under development. Any environment where Iran is able to operate freely can become a forward-deployed missile base for such systems and for many other kinds of weapons that you see here today. This threatens Israel and other partners, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Comment: This 2018 briefing neatly summarizes the US position on Iranian support for proxy groups in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and ballistic missiles.
UN Secretary General Report on Iranian Weapons
On 19 May 2020, the Australian authorities provided to the Secretariat relevant information pertaining to the seizure in June 2019 of arms and related materiel. The authorities informed the Secretariat that while on operations in the Middle East region, the HMAS Ballarat, an Australian vessel, boarded a dhow in international waters off the Gulf of Oman, about 150 km south-east of Muscat. The materiel seized onboard included “approximately 476,000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, and 697 bags of chemical fertiliser”.
The crew of the dhow had Iranian passports and identification cards and claimed to have sailed on 19 June 2019 from Bandar Abbas in the Islamic Republic of Iran, en route to Somalia and Yemen. A crew member also claimed that the materiel had been delivered to the dhow by Iranian military personnel.
Iran’s Foreign Defense Policies
Iran’s national security policy is arguably the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, perception of threats to the regime and to the country, and long-standing national interests. Iran’s leadership:
Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime.
Takes advantage of regional conflicts to advance a broader goal of overturning a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes.
Seeks to restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of ancient Persian empires.
Provides material support to regional allied governments and armed factions, including increasingly precise missile systems that enable Iran to project power.
Supports acts of international terrorism, as the “leading” or “most active” state sponsor of terrorism, according to annual State Department reports on international terrorism.
Backs actions against international shipping in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq that represent, in part, an attempt to pressure the United States to relax sanctions on Iran. These actions have continued despite Iran’s struggles with the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak there.
2019 Defense Intelligence Agency Iran Military Review
To achieve its goals, Iran continues to rely on its unconventional warfare elements and asymmetric capabilities— intended to exploit the perceived weaknesses of a superior adversary—to provide deterrence and project power. This combination of lethal conventional capabilities and proxy forces poses a persistent threat. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force leads Iranian power projection through a complex network of state and nonstate partners and militant proxies. Iran’s conventional military emphasizes niche capabilities and guerilla style tactics against its technologically advanced adversaries. Its substantial arsenal of ballistic missiles is designed to overwhelm U.S. forces and our partners in the region. Its swarms of small boats, large inventory of naval mines, and arsenal of antiship missiles can severely disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz—a strategic chokepoint critical to global trade. Each of these forces are becoming increasingly survivable, precise, and responsive.
In more recent years, with the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, Iran has taken nascent steps toward developing a limited expeditionary capability. Iran’s conventional forces are now in the regional power projection game as well. At the same time, modern conventional capabilities will be open to Iran for the first time since the revolution, as the UN arms embargo is scheduled to end by October 2020. With these opportunities, we could begin to see significant changes in Iranian strategy and capabilities, as Iran becomes a more traditional military force.
Atlantic Council on Iran’s Likely Purchases
Michael Eisenstadt, director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a long-time student of Iran’s capabilities, reminded this author that Tehran and Moscow haggled for a decade over the S-300 system. He predicted that Iran would go after “niche systems to provide niche capabilities and will not seek or be able to achieve the recapitalization of the Iranian military inventory or a total makeover of the Iranian military.” Iran will look for components—navigation, guidance and propulsion technologies—to improve its indigenous drone, cruise, and ballistic missile programs, Eisenstadt added. Iran has provided some of this technology to regional partners, defying the UN embargo and other sanctions.
Amerian said Iran wants fighter jets, logistics aircraft, and helicopters. Russian Su-30SM fighters or the Chinese JF-17, which China co-produces with Pakistan, have been mentioned as possible purchases. Amerian says the latter is more likely because the JF-17 is $10 million cheaper than the Sukhoi, easier to maintain, and uses the Klimov RD-33 turbofan, which Iran already has experience working with from its fleet of Mig-29As.
Eisenstadt said Iran would also like to purchase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technology so it no longer has to depend on Russia to support ground forces, as has been the case in their mutual intervention in Syria to prop up the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Furthermore, Iran is looking for new radar-guided air-to-air missiles, such as the Russian R-77-1 or the Chinese PL-15 and has expressed interest in the Russian T-90 main battle tank.
Iran Challenges to Security in Space
Tehran states it has developed sophisticated capabilities, including SLVs (space launch vehicles) and communications and remote sensing satellites, but its SLVs are only able to launch microsatellites into LEO (low earth orbit) and have proven unreliable. Nonetheless, Iran has had a few successful launches of the two-stage Safir SLV since its first attempt in 2008. It has also revealed the larger two-stage Simorgh SLV, which could serve as a test bed for developing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technologies. Because of the inherent overlap in technology between ICBMs and SLVs, Iran’s development of larger, more capable SLV boosters remains a concern for a future ICBM capability. Also, these advancements could be applied to developing a basic ground-based ASAT (anti-satellite) missile, should Iran choose to do so in the future
Comment: It is widely believed that elements of Iran’s satellite and ballistic missile programs were developed with North Korean input and assistance.