Iran's Chemical Weapons
Mehran Babri, a scientist associated with the OPCW, an organization dedicated to the elimination of chemical weapons, is now alleged to be heading Iran's chemical weapons development.
Although Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons remains the predominant occupation of policy planners in Washington, a recent pair of sanctions designations highlighted another area of US concern: chemical weapons. On December 3, 2020, the United States imposed sanctions on Mehran Babri, and the organization he heads, the Shahid Meisami Group (SMG), identifying the pair as being critical to the Iranian chemical weapons program.
SMG is a part of the Iranian Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, also known as SPND, an entity that has been previously targeted by the United States. SPND was headed by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the Iranian nuclear scientist who was recently assassinated in an apparent Israeli operation.
The Iran-Iraq War
In some ways the designations and the US accusations are surprising: Iran is mostly known as a victim of chemical weapons. During the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran was subject to massive chemical attacks by Saddam Hussein’s forces. Tehran contends that Western technology and expertise were critical to helping the the Iraqi dictator develop his capabilities.
Towards the end of the war Iran appears to have developed its own capabilities, although this capacity was far more limited compared to Iraq’s, whose arsenal was vast. Iraqi intelligence assessments identified support was being extended to Iran by West Germany, North Korea, Pakistan, as well as Syria, among others:
In 1987, it was alleged that Tehran exchanged some chemical munitions with Libya in return for Soviet mines:
The US Position
The US continues to demand further details of this Libyan transfer, and cites this incident to claim that Iran maintains an active research program. This position has been re-iterated a number of times including most recently in November 2020:
The Current Program
Although Treasury and the Department of State did not provide any additional details about Babri, open source searches reveals a rich vein of information. Babri appears to be active in research germane to chemical warfare, although in an unexpected manner. The bulk of his work online appears to deal with developing novel methods of detecting chemical weapons.
OPCW
In addition, Babri appears to have had a long association with the OPCW, an organization that is dedicated to the elimination of chemical warfare. Babri has routinely attended the secretariat, and contributed to technical working groups within the organization. Much of this work was carried out under the Defence Chemical Research Lab of Iran.
Sources and Methods
Sanctions on Iranian Entities Involved in Chemical Weapons Activities of Concern
The United States condemns any Iranian regime involvement in a chemical weapons program and will sanction those involved in any such activity. Today, the United States designated Iranian defense entity Shahid Meisami Group and its director, Mehran Babri, under Executive Order 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or WMD delivery systems, and their supporters.
In addition to the freezing of any U.S. assets held by Shahid Meisami Group and Mehran Babri, both will be denied access to the U.S. financial system and listed online as WMD proliferators.
The United States is concerned about the regime’s true intent with regard to the testing and production of these so-called chemical incapacitation agents, which could be used either to further oppress Iranian citizens or for offensive purposes. The United States remains firmly committed to countering the full range of the regime’s malign activities and expects the international community to maintain vigilance against the regime’s illicit capabilities and behavior.
Treasury Designates Entity Subordinate to Iran’s Military Firm
Mehran Babri is the head of Shahid Meisami Group. Prior to his current position at Shahid Meisami Group, Babri worked at Iran’s Defense Chemical Research Lab.
Mehran Babri is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Shahid Meisami Group, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13382.
Iran’s Chemical Weapons Capabilities
Assessing Iran's CW capabilities is difficult—although there is an apparent wealth of information, very little of it constitutes original material. The greater part of published information on Iran's CW programs consists of repackaged information from a limited number of sources.
The tendency to fit new information into a pre-existing framework that presumes the existence of a covert offensive CW program introduces additional problems. Ultimately, all public assessments of Iran's alleged CW program depend heavily upon information gathered from Iranian opposition groups and Western intelligence agencies. Doubts about the validity of information publicly released by Western intelligence agencies have increased since 2003 due to investigations that revealed selective reporting, the use of unreliable or biased sources, an unwillingness to emphasize uncertainty, and a failure to properly assess the veracity or reliability of available information. [1]
Nonetheless, revelations since 2003 regarding the extent of Iran's previously concealed civilian nuclear program do raise the question of whether Iran might indeed be hiding a CW program. To piece together an objective overview of allegations surrounding Iran and its CW capabilities, the following profile mines open source literature while taking into consideration the above-mentioned problems and limitations.
2007 Intelligence Assessment to Congress
While Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in late 1997, it continues to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could advance Iran's assessed chemical weapons (CW) program. We assess that Iran maintains the capability to produce CW agent in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive applications. We judge that Iran still maintains a capability to weaponize CW agents in a variety of delivery systems.
2008 CSIS Assessment
Special chemical, biological and nuclear industries in the Ministry of Defense. A special organization dubbed Special Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Industries has been set up in the Ministry of Defense. This entity is also involved in chemical and biological activity. Brigadier General Seyyedi is in charge of this organization. His predecessor was named Dr. Abbass-pour, who had been appointed by Rafsanjani. This organization is in charge of arming the regime with microbial and chemical bombs and has been strengthened during Khatami's presidency.
The organization is also responsible for procuring technological needs of microbial and chemical weapons as well as chemical and microbial bombs. A number of foreign microbial weapons experts from China, North Korea, India, and Russia are cooperating with the Ministry of Defense of the Iranian regime. A number of them have been hired by this organization. The Biological Research Center of Special Industries Organization is located at Shahid Meisami, Martyr Meisami complex on Special Karaj Highway, 27 kilometers near the steel factory.
Note: This assessment indicates that the SMG is also active in biological weapons research
2014 Announcement of Sanctions on SPND
Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research:
The Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND) is a Tehran-based entity that is primarily responsible for research in the field of nuclear weapons development. SPND was established in February 2011 by the UN-sanctioned individual Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who for many years has managed activities useful in the development of a nuclear explosive device. Fakhrizadeh led such efforts in the late 1990s or early 2000s, under the auspices of the “AMAD Plan, the MODAFL subsidiary Section for Advanced Development Applications and Technologies (SADAT) and Malek Ashtar University of Technology (MUT). In February 2011, Fakhrizadeh left MUT to establish SPND. Fakhrizadeh was designated in UNSCR 1747 (2007) and by the United States in July 2008 for his involvement in Iran’s proscribed WMD activities. SPND took over some of the activities related to Iran’s undeclared nuclear program that had previously been carried out by Iran’s Physics Research Center, the AMAD Plan, MUT, and SADAT.
2019 US Assessment of SMG and Iran’s
Note: CR is an abbreviation for the irritant chemical dibenzoxazepine
SMG in Iraq
Note: SMG exhibited its products in Iraq, along with US military firms.
SMG’s Work in Iran
Note: SMG appears to be part of Iran’s broader research ecosystem and has been awarded a number of prizes domestically, including the above “Khawrizmi” innovation award by the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology and the Iranian Research Organization for Research and Innovation